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—
—
was for Europe’s 
lease as part of debt repayment due to Sri Lanka’s default) raises caution for populations of 
How Big is China’s Belt and Road ’
’
arshall Plan and “America First”
e Raises Transparency Issues with China’s Belt and Road 
measure up to the international community’s articulated expectations as to responsible 
(5) China’s own commitment to adhere to 
China: ‘Belt and Road’ Projects Should Respect Rights
U.N. Int’l Conference on Financing for Developmen
–
–
A Human Rights Focus to Upgrade China’s International Lending, 
–
“P ” –
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based approach to … international cooperation, 
ns that it should, among others, “consider the establishment of a legal 
not negatively impact human rights abroad… [and] [t]ake further measures on business and
Principles on Business and Human Rights.”
I will address certain “human rights imperialism”
against the “rights based approach to development,”
crystallizing “right to development.”
focused on the centrality of human rights to “legislation, administrative practice, and policy 
delivery,”
— —
Beyond ‘Rights Based Approaches’? Employing a Process and 
’







the World Bank’s sup
as the People’s Republic of China’s announcement of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
n detailing China’s grand dramatic geopolitical vision for 
’
India’s Answer to the Belt and Road: A Road Map for South Asia
European Comm’n 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment, and Finance Landscape, 
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/86739.htm; Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n and the Gov’t of the H.K. 
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Arrangement on Supporting Hong Kong’s Participation in the Belt and Road 
China’s Arctic Policy, 
– ; Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/14216.htm; The Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n, 
– (2017); The Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n & the Nat’l Energy Administration of 
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/13694.htm; The Ministry of Envtl. Prot. of the People’s Republic of China, 
’ ’
; Ministry of Culture of the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Culture’s 
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/12479.htm; Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, 
’
Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China, et al., 
Supreme People’s Court, Opinions on the People’s Courts Providing Judicial Services and Guarantees for the 
of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China, te the “Belt and Road” Special Plan for 
the People’s Republic of China, ‘The Belt and Road’ Vision and Actions for Cooperation in 
Institutions of the ‘Belt & Road’ Initiative: A Systematic Literature Review, 
’
BRI’s contractual, legal, and financial arrangements with debtor countries is not standardized 
keeping with Deng Xiaoping’s famous (“hide brightness and cherish 
obscurity”) foreign policy strategy,
outsiders’ optimism and pessimism regarding the BRI’s development consequences for 
predominantly from a single sovereign source, the People’s Republic of China. (Although it 









China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative: Mapping the World Trade Normative 
Lying Low No More?: China’s New Thinking on the 
’
Five Myths About China’s Belt and Road Initiative
See Inside China’s Plan to Create a Modern Silk Road
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Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held in Beijing, China’s President Xi 
Jinping described the BRI as exemplifying China’s grand vision for global development, 
China’s state




, China’s Xi can be ‘
’, CNBC (Apr. 27, 2019, 7:47 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/27/belt
connect networks of highways, railways and sea ports…Third, we should 
build the Belt and Road into a road of opening up….
[…]
broad community of shared interests. […]
scholarship in Chinese academic journals themselves superlatively depict the BRI as “a 
ance;” “China’s grand diplomacy;” “shaping a 
Century;” “China’s Exploration in the Construction of International 
Institutions;” China creating a “Regional Community of Common Destiny;” “China’s 
Marshall Plan;” with China’s vast “pot
the laws that establish its order.”
The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s Grand Diplomacy, 
’
’
“ ” Initiative and China’s Exploration in the Construction of International 
Conceptual Analysis of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Road Towards a Regional 
’
“ ” Initiative: China’s Marshall Plan ’
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Bank used the following graphic to illustrate the 71 economies located in the BRI’s transport 
As described by China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of 
Road is designed to go from China’s coast to Eur
China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast 
r are closely related to the BRI. […]”
including “an Artic ‘Ice Silk Road’…extend[ing] to more than 71 countries, together 
[comprising] up to 65% of the world’s po
of 2017.” The unprecedented scale of these projects run parallel with China’s global drive 




United States’ Marshall Plan (the postwar European Recovery Program),
[…] It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do 
Press Release, Nat’l Dev. and Reform Comm’n & Ministry of Com. of the People’s Republic of China, 
William Laurance, “The Dark Legacy of China’s Drive for Global Resources”, Yale Environment 360, 28 
”
‘
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will not constitute foreign aid but rather creates a global program for financing China’s 
projects with strategic partners along the “Belt and Road.” The March 2018 Amendment
to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China enshrined the 
principles include “a new vision for development ”
Upholding absolute Party leadership over the people’s forces;
Thirteenth National People’s Congress, Xianfa Xiuzheng’an, (The Amendments to the Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of China), 1st Sess., Mar. 11, 2018, http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4866_0_7.html. 
Upholding the principles of ‘one country, two systems’ and promoting 
Noting China’s vision for development, the March 2018 Amendment to China’s 
A May 2019 article of Chinese President Xi Jinping, titled “Deepening Understanding 
ent,” speaks of China’s creation of “development models 
Thirteenth National People’s Congress, Xianfa Xiuzheng’an, (The Amendments to the Constitution of the 
e’s Republic of China), art. 32, 1st Sess., Mar. 11, 2018, 
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that give full play to [China’s] first mover advantages.” This gives substance to China’s 
Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development defines the right to development as “an 
.”
same Article 1 goes on to emphasize that the “human right to development also implies 
their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources.”
and cultural rights themselves: “the right to development is an inalienable human right, 
symbolizing dignity and honor…a means of eliminating poverty [that] provides the 
ights…the right to development is 
rights, and obtaining civil and political rights.”
The subtle but significant difference between these two conceptions lies with China’s 
In this sense, China’s
the right to development dovetails with another scholar’s observations that:
statist political and economic agendas using the language of rights…it is 




on the right to development that this paper examines China’s vision, actions, and 
commitments in its BRI. Clearly, the BRI is “not a selfless venture”, and it is “not China’s 
Marshall Plan”.
involve China’s state – –
vehicle for “China’s economic statecraft.”
Globalizing China’s paradigm
The Belt and Road Initiative is Not China’s Marshall Plan
Reports of China Using its ‘Belt and Road’ Program for Military Purposes are ‘No 
Real Surprise’
Defining China’s Grand Strategy and the Future World Order 1, 2 (Mar. 2018) (unpublished Master’s thesis, 
To Join or Not to Join? State Ownership, Commercial Interests, and China’s Belt 
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Other scholars have elaborated on this paradigm, contrasting China’s development financing 
paradigm’s differen
composition and approach of China’s lending portfolio; and (3) the governance of China’s 
China’s development financing paradigm has been 
…Chinese national [development finance institutions or DFIs] operating 
In terms of lending practices, China’s national DFIs operating abroad tend 
–
we term in this article ‘coordinated credit spaces’.  The NDB, on a smaller 
MDBs, following an individual project finance approach….
currency…[a]ll of these DFIs expect to be repaid in the currency that they 
lend in, with the exception of China’s policy banks, which hav
rn DFIs have done until recently…
With respect to governance, China’s national DFIs have a single 
shareholder governance structure…Unlike the Western
procurement conditions at times at the project level…
The absence of policy conditions to China’s development financing has been argued as 
ment finance “is indifferent to risk, in particular it is uncorrelated with indices of 
political stability and rule of law…[s]ome major borrowers from China have encountered 
debt sustainability problems while other borrowers are in good fiscal shape…Chines
be evolving towards those norms.”
been used to emphasize the rise of the “Beijing Consensus,”
“Washington Consensus” th
The main types of China’s financing into the BRI projects have been identified as: (1) 
BRI projects themselves appear to frequently change according to China’s 
I as a ‘debt trap’ for lower income countries, China’s Ministry 
David Dollar & John L. Thornton, Is China’s Development Finance a Challenge to the International Order? 
Is the “Beijing Consensus” Now Dominant?, 
’ Debating China’s Economic Growth: The Beiji
China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Recalibration and New Opport
It’s a (Debt) Trap! Managing China
’
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW
“with the aim to promote sustainable economic and social development 
countries while ensuring debt sustainability.”
framework is disavowed immediately by China’s Ministry of Finance as “a non
risks according to the risk rating results, as an important reference for lending decisions.”
There is nothing in the text of this document that indicates whether China’s Ministry of 
debtor country’s assumption of debt. The document tacitly conveys that the onus falls more 
borrowers, rather than reining in China’s financing for BRI projects that might not meet any 
The seeming ambiguity of China’s views about its role and responsibility as a sovereign 
ith China’s stated commitments 
during its Third Universal Periodic Review before the Human Rights Council, where China’s 
Foreign Minister hailed China’s “human rights achievements, human rights 
development path, and the country’s determination to prom
situation…China has decided to accept 284 out of 346 recommendations put forward by 
various parties.”
“promote measures that ensure that development and infrastructure projects inside and 
New Data on the “Debt Trap” 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Why the Price is Too High
’
–
Dell’Erba et al., 
’
’
commitments from the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”
recommendation to “[c]onsider the establishment 
rights abroad…[t]ake further measures on business and human rights in line with its 
Human Rights.”
China’s obligations as a treaty party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
ts in 2014 “to adopt a human rights
iving countries.”
The clamor for transparency and predictability with respect to China’s most massive 
under China’s own voluntarily stated commitments to the UN Hu
labour and human rights in China’s international investment agreements.
“[p]arties shall accoun
Press Release, CICDHA, “China Commits to the United Nations Human Rights Council to Respect 
Human Rights in its Foreign Investments” (Mar. 19, 2019).
–
’
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and consistency….”
full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, China’s 
environmental and social safeguards as part of China’s external lending and outbound 
State’s most recent national human rights plan of action (2012–
considered likely to violate “any international treaty conducted by China 
with a foreign party” would not be approved. While in theory this allows 
China Banking Regulatory Commission’s Green Credi
“hazards and risks [to] the environment and society that may be brought 
institutions’ client
climate change”. Article 10 stipulates that Chinese banking 
to “establish and constantly improve policies, systems and processes for 
environmental and social risk management”, while article 11 requires 
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW




A Human Rights Focus to Upgrade China’s International Lending, 
China’s articulated philosophy and normative approach to what it asserts as the content of 
called “rule of law based” sovereign 




Public Utilities, and Public Concerns: A Practitioner’s Perspective, ’
’
’
i’s Speech at the Opening of Belt and Road Forum
Leaders’ Roundtable of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Coop
’
Joint Communique of the Leaders’ Roundtable of the 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International 
Proposals to Promote the “Belt and Road” Initiative
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transparency and accountability in the supposed ‘win win cooperation’
to forge with most of the world under the aegis of ‘development’ through the BRI. In April 
for the first time that the BRI will “adopt widely 
respected.”
relief from BRI projects, on the reasoning that “the BRI loans are not foreign aid…[Chi
need[s] to at least recoup principal and a moderate interest.”
it has listed in its BRI website. Other documents released in April 2019 along with China’s 
of July 1, 2018, the Supreme People’s Court of China issued its “Regulations on Several 
Issues Regarding the Establishment of International Commercial Courts” (one in 
’
James Kynge and Sun Yu, “China faces wave of calls for debt relief on ‘Belt and Road’ projects”, The 
China’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative: Scope, 
’ China’s Governance Approach to 
—
—
Project finance refers to a “nonrecourse or limited recourse financing structure in which 
collateral for debt.”
’ ’ ’ ’
– ’
Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative Undermining Human Right
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW
– –
…A 







‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative: Can a Bilaterally Negotiated ‘Globalization 2.0’ Int
’
(“distinguish ‘megaprojects’ from 
none of the publicly available BRI official documents from China’s official websites indicate 
what China’s actual debt repayment terms are, the unfortunate result is an “opaque build
of debt…[which could cause] risk[s] to the world economy.”
that “better fiscal transparency, political trust, and credit ratings are connected with a lower 
cost of sovereign debt…higher corruption, bu
unemployment make sovereign rates increase.” Other researchers also affirm that “high 
debt levels can limit a sovereign government’s capacity to provide social services necessary 
term development strategies…[and] after a government defaults, the mechanisms for 




more or less autonomous subprojects. Further, ‘Global Megaprojects’
differing languages and institutions.”).
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The World Bank’s 
Bank’s CDD programs are committed to operate on “principles of
accountability, and enhanced local capacity.”
“Bilateral Documents” are little more than a collection of vision
—Malaysia’
(ECRL); Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port and Colombo Port; Pakistan’s China
Economic Corridor (CPEC); Laos’ Kunming Vientiane Railway; and Kazakhstan’s Khorgos 
—
’
The World Bank’s Land of Kiosks: Community Driven 
Malaysia’s East Coast Rail L
South China Sea with shipping routes in Malaysia’s western provinces, and two gas 
The East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) would connect Malaysia’s Port Klang on the Strait of 
Construction Company, subject to the regulatory supervision of Malaysia’s Ministry of 
even as Malaysia’s regional 
Malaysia’s Canceled Belt and Road Initiative Pro
Malaysia Rethinks $20B “Belt and Road” Project
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW
Malaysia’s Department of 
Evolving Paradigms in Malaysia’s Regional Development Policy
Future of Malaysia’s China
environmental impact assessment. The 2017 EIA Report noted that “[l]and and property 
construction phase…people affected by the 
cohesion.” Malaysia Rail Link committed to “provide early and adequate information to 
ensure continuous engagement.”
environmental impacts during the construction phase would include “soil erosion and 
related to public safety.”
sia Rail Link committed to “mainstreaming environmental protection into the 
engagement with all stakeholders throughout the life of the Project.”
the Project’s implementation, for any environmental, social, and human rights impacts.
Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port and Colombo Port
nka’s 
Sri Lanka’s Port Development and the Role of the BRI
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW
reported that Sri Lanka’s environmental impact asse
defects due to “lack of environmental, social protection policies and proper post monitoring 
plan…[as well as problems with the assessment process as to] lack of incorporate[ion] [of] 
concepts in evaluation.”
The Hambantota Port Development Project is part of China’s seaport
the Indian Ocean that have been described as “win
–
oriented governance strategy.”
The Cost of China’s Belt and Road ’ ’
’
Between Geoeconomics and Geopolitics: China’s Participation in the Seaport Constructions 
Year Lease on Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port
assign blame to Sri Lanka’s government for mishandling the port project altogether.
massive infrastructure through land reclamation near Sri Lanka’s capital of Colombo, for the 
a “foreign direct investment (FDI) by CHEC Port City Colombo (Pvt) Ltd (the Project 
(CCCC)…major components of Port City at a glance are: 1) total land area reclaimed 269 
hectares…”
’ Enhancing China’s Overseas Investment Image through Public 
’
Destiny of the Pearl: How Sri Lanka’s Colombo Consensus Trump
’
Chinese Firm Completes US$1.4 Billion Land Reclamation Works for Sri Lanka’s 
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW
for a vast array of regional infrastructure connectivity projects, spanning “integrated 
transport and [information technology] systems…energy cooperation, spatial layout, 
development…tourism cooperation…[livelihood cooperation], financial cooperation, and 
human resource development.”






’ CPEC’s Environmental Toll
(Apr. 18, 2018), 
Pakistan Economic Corridor Show the Limitations of China’s ‘One 




China’s Yunnan provincial capital of Kunming and the Laotian capital of Vientiane, 
project cost, since Laos remains “one of Southeast Asia’s poorest countries…[with annual 
Gross Domestic Product of just USD$16 Billion]…[O]f the [estimated] USD$6 Billion cost 
remaining 30 percent with loans from Chinese financial institutions.”
Vientiane Railway is intended to “connect south to lines in Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Singapore.”
cial Times reported that this project was “carried out with little public 
consultation. . . . Laos’s government has taken on $480m of loans from China’s Eximbank, 
The amount is equivalent to about 2 per cent of Laos’s gross domestic 
product. However, the IMF classifies Laos as a country with an ‘elevated’ risk of debt 
project’s backers have not made the business plan public, so little is known 
related business ecosystem.”
’
China’s US$7 Billion Railway Link to Laos is Almost Half Done, on Schedule to Begin Ser
–
Laos’s Belt and Road Project Sparks Questions Over China Ambitions
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW
sources, and the stresses on Laos’ ability to
Kazakhstan’s Khorgos Gateway
The Khorgos Gateway has been described as “the biggest
world…connect(ing) Kazakhstan to China by rail.  Khorgos will soon enter the record books 
as home to the world’s biggest dry port. Perhaps appropriately, Khorgos occupies one of the 
furthest points on Earth from any ocean.”
described as a “much less transformative project than its proponents believe…Khorgos is 
ral Asia.”
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society: the first is that there will be an ‘invasion’ of Chinese migrants who 
questioning the border agreements and suddenly demand more land.”
’
rights impacts of Kazakhstan’s Khorgos Gateway likewise does not assuage any of the local 
infusion of China’s vast surplus capital on
state’s governme
scrutiny by civil society organizations. The ‘democratic’ nature of the BRI is to be seen 
BRI’s sovereign lender, on the assumption that BRI debtor governments functionally 
‘democracy’ in financing development projects is problematic, and does not meet
and Borrowing are also particularly apropos with respect to China’s role as the sovereign 
China’s Path Forward is Getting Bumpy
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW
lender in the BRI, given its current largely “hands off” approach to how BRI debtor 
markets and financial techniques, others less so.  The lender’s 
make a realistic assessment of the sovereign borrower’s capacity to 
Lending beyond a borrower’s reasonable capacity to repay not only 
borrower’s situation, lenders should consider the broad and real 
have a direct economic interest in assessing the borrower’s repayment 
l lender’s geopolitical influence, however, will 
involve other motivations…The desire to realize such benefits from a 
borrower’s repayment capacity.  Lending decisions are critically 
the loan…This monitoring should be transparent and not affect any 
sovereign’s faculty to decide on its developmental priorities.
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w to its BRI projects.  By assuming legal responsibility as potentially the world’s 
truly “win
cooperation” to realize the right to development, as defined in Article 1(1) of the 1986 United 
—
treaty party to the ICESCR; the Paris Agreement; as part of China’s Third Universal Periodic 
Review commitments to the Human Rights Council; as part of China’s own domestic rules 
This reinforces China’s responsi
–
“States parties may be held directly responsible for the action or inaction of business entities: 
(a) if the entity concerned is in fact acting on that State party’s instructions or is un
context of public contracts; (b) when a business entity is empowered under the State party’s 
own.” China’s ICESCR obligations may, in these circumstances, apply even for 
trol and oversight by China’s government ministries as seen from the list of 
At the very least, well beyond China’s voluminous non
in a climate where China’s promotion of the BRI does not include complete disclosure of all 
the document vaguely referring only to China’s possible inclusion of “environmental and 
social responsibilities…in [a] loan contract.”
to the host country’s 




China: ‘Belt and Road’ Projects Should Respect Rights: Commit to Transparency, Public Consultation at 
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW
be referred to.”
“a borrowing nation is unable to provide a bank or sovereign guarantee, it is possible that a 
as a replacement for a sovereign guarantee.”
—
—
population’s rights to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health under 
15 (especially when the natural resource is central to a local community’s identity, culture, 
and way of life); as well as (4) the rights of the BRI debtor country’s population to
The Deforestation Risks of China’s Belt 
Some policy practitioners argue that the BRI’s threat to human rights and good 
’s model of development financing:
term financial consequences of China’s loans –
them, assuming the bills will come due on a future government’s watch… 
known example of Belt and Road’s negative impact on 
a country’s balance sheet. But Sri
—
—
dependence on China and expands Beijing’s influence. As a result, 
—
even if future governments seek to exit Beijing’s orbit….
exert influence well beyond countries’ foreign policy choices. The 
Beijing’s zeal to curb bribery and corporate malfeasance limited to its 
—
—
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China’s planned development of a “new digital Silk Road has received 
equally troubling. China’s digital bluep
will serve to export elements of Beijing’s surveillance regime. Indeed, 
China’s ZTE Corporation “sold 
activity.” Today, Chinese tech giant Huawei is partnering with the 
government of Kenya to construct “safe cities” that leverage thousands of 
ameras feeding data into a public security cloud “to keep an 
eye on what is going on generally” according to the company’s 
promotional materials. Not all elements of China’s domestic surveillance 
regime are exportable, but as the “New Digital Silk Road” ta
stifle free speech, at a minimum by strengthening Beijing’s ability to 
willing to call out Beijing’s domestic human rights abuses, for instance, 
confronting the choice between Belt and Road’s immediate –
–
may well follow Greece’s example. Similarly, companies dependent on 
et are already acquiescing to Beijing’s demands –
as by firing an American employee who “liked” a pro
–
imagine government officials feeling similarly compelled.”
On China’s New Silk Road, Democracy Pays a Toll: China’s Vast 
’
is “poised” to support a BRI that 
…China’s leadership on climate action is helping to show the way.  
China’s new cutting
and securing an agreement at last December’s United Nations Climate 
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and our common commitment to leave no one behind.”
communities impacted by BRI development projects, taking into account China’s explicit 
development projects is arguably well within the purview of China’s treaty obligations to 
to prevent abuses of Covenant rights in a business entity’s supply c
Alignment of China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Sustainable Development Goals, Secretary
Development and China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 
acts on indigenous peoples’ rights to land, 
peoples’ own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior 
individual and on communities’ enjoyment of Covenant rights, by 
corruption of judges, human rights abuses are left unremedied.”
–
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China’s ICESCR commitments—
—
domestic “laws, regulations, policies, and standards” that 
protective coverage in China’s around 145 international investment agreements thus far.
These “in accordance with law”
’
’
Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the 
–
Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
–
rnment of the People’s Republic of China, China –
People’s Republic of China on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, China –
overnment of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of 
–
Between the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Uganda on the Reciprocal 
–
Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Guyana on the 
–
Between the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
–
Comment No. 24, by purposely recognizing that the host State’s international enviro
communities’ participation, access, and transparency with respect to BRI project 
—
—
President Xi Jinping’s articulated April 2019 commitmen
China’s binding international legal commitments under the 
on Climate Change, China’s own domestic r
activities and foreign lending, and China’s specific voluntary commitments made to the 
hand, China’s commitment of massive surplus funds as investment or sovereign loans is an 
streams comparing the risks of incurring foreign debt and investment from the “Beijing 
Consensus,” as opposed to historically dominant paradigms under the “Washington 
” Both mo
—
hope that these projects truly redound to these populations’ rights to development. 
simply about the narrower scope of “rights to development,”
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW
a country’s foreign lending and/or foreign investment policies, precisely because it imposes 
al and cultural development “in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms [are realized]” or “that is consistent with or based on all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.”
to another form of “human rights imperialism” characterized by many scholars




corpus of individuals, groups, and communities that forms any State’s population. Assuming 
making is somehow ‘imperialist’ because 
—
’
that neither the “Beijing Consensus ” the “Washington Consensus ” or any other 
—
—
g into account Chinese President Xi Jinping’s April 2019 declaration to align the 
investment projects, China’s existing treaty commitments under the ICESCR, the 
Agreement on Climate Change, China’s expressed support for Agenda 2030 for Sustainable 
Development, as well as China’s voluntary commitments to the Human Rights Council 
during China’s Third Universal Periodic Review, alongside the emerging or crystal
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW
—
—
of its financing contracts for the BRI, ensuring that China’s responsibilities as a sovereign 
BRI debtor states’ 
states’ many constituencies (and not just finance ministries) to ensure that the terms of BRI 
of the BRI debtor state’s ability to pay, based on comprehensive due diligence including 
project. China’s ICESCR obligations are treaty commitments that, as elab
development project could be remedied either under the BRI debtor state’s domestic law and 
—
consultations, and the community’s shared ownership of oversight for project impacts—
projects. China has announced that Chinese international commercial courts in Xi’an, 
the opportunity for affected individuals or communities’ direct recourse in the BRI contracts 
China’s commitments to realize the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development—
—
ation in the Context of China’s Belt and Road Projects
Beginning of ‘Belt and Road’ Disputes Between China and its Partners?: As Beijing’s Ambitious Initiative Turns 
Meet the 8 Chinese Judges Who’ll
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW
—
occur from BRI debtor states’ enforcement of environmental, labor, social, and all other 
—
—
China’s “Beijing Consensus” model of development fi
as exemplified in the BRI, demonstrates a vast gulf thus far between China’s articulated 
velopment, China’s domestic regulations 
on overseas investment, and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s April 2019 declaration aligning 
Shifting Sands in the International Economic System: “Arbitrage” in International 
49 Geo. J. Int’l L. 1019, 1103 –
n the real face of ‘imperialism.’
